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Some scholars fear that governments “are failing to take aggressive steps to address the risks of sea-
level rise” out of fear of prompting “takings” litigation.1 Takings liability is among the most 
commonly asserted claims against municipalities, particularly where land use decisions limit the 
development of valuable land in coastal areas. This document explains what takings are and how 
takings lawsuits may apply to coastal management decisions. After introducing the fundamental 
concepts of takings law, it specifically addresses potential takings claims associated with coastal 
permitting decisions and the construction and management of coastal infrastructure. This fact sheet 
is provided solely for educational purposes and does not provide legal advice. 
1 What is a taking? 
The takings clause requires the government to provide “just compensation” to any person whose 
property is “taken” for a public use.2 Both the U.S. and the Massachusetts constitutions include a 
takings clause. While plaintiffs can sue under either constitution, there is “no substantial difference 
in [their] interpretation.”3 Thus, takings cases apply in Massachusetts even if they involve actions in 
other states.  
For a taking to occur, the plaintiff must satisfy two prerequisites. First, the plaintiff must have lost a 
property interest recognized under state law.4 For example, Massachusetts law does not recognize a 
property right to a view, so loss of view cannot be a taking in that state.5 Second, the loss must result 
from governmental action for the benefit of the public.6 Thus, damage caused solely by natural forces or by a 
private party do not result in takings,7 and inaction, such as failure to maintain infrastructure, is not a 
taking (though it may be a tort).8 For example, failure to inform the public about flood risk is 
unlikely to be a taking. In addition, not every affirmative government action that interferes in 
property is a taking—the action must be for public benefit.9 If the prerequisites are met in a 
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particular case, the court will engage in a fact-specific inquiry to determine whether a taking has 
occurred.10 
If a court determines that a taking has occurred, the plaintiff will receive compensation. The amount 
of compensation is the fair market value of the property interest that was taken.11 If part of a 
property is taken, the plaintiff will receive the value only of that part; for example, the value of an 
easement is calculated as the difference in the value of the property before and after the easement 
was taken.12 The compensation may also be reduced or eliminated where the government action 
directly benefits the property owner.13  
2 Types of takings 
Courts consider the means, duration, and impact of government action to determine what law to apply 
to the facts of each case.14  
• The means of a taking can include a physical taking or a regulatory taking.15  
• The duration of a taking may be temporary or permanent.16  
• The impact of a taking may be categorical (also known as per se or practical confiscation) or 
partial.17 
In the coastal context, takings cases can arise from any combination of these categories. Physical 
takings may result from a variety of government actions, such as infrastructure development, 
shoreline protection structures (by erosion of neighboring land), or flood management decisions.18 
Regulatory takings often arise from land use restrictions, such as setbacks or denial of building 
permits, which can categorically or partially restrict the use of private land. Government action may 
cause temporary takings, such as flooding, or permanently occupy land or restrict its use. By 
understanding how courts decide takings cases, coastal municipalities can identify when their actions 
may result in a taking and help them decide whether and how to proceed with a planned action. 
2.1 Physical Takings 
Physical takings involve occupation of private property and may result from intentional occupation 
of private land or from government actions that foreseeably result in occupation of private property. 
Even a temporary physical invasion, such as by floodwater after a storm, may constitute a taking.19 
And any physical occupation, no matter how small, is categorically considered a taking.20 
Eminent domain and condemnation are well-recognized forms of physical takings that occupy 
private property and can arise in coastal protection projects. For example, government construction 
of a dune system on private property was a taking, although damages were minimal because of the 
benefits provided to the landowners.21 Coastal infrastructure projects that require the occupation of 
any private land in the form of an easement or complete property transfer will require compensation 
as a result of either a voluntary agreement or takings litigation. 
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Government actions that indirectly occupy private lands are also regarded as physical takings. For 
example, a regulation requiring landlords to allow installation of a cable box on their property was a 
taking, despite the cable box occupying only a small area.22 For a government action to cause a 
physical taking, the harm must be a predictable result of the action and have a sufficiently substantial 
impact on the plaintiffs.23 These conditions can be met for coastal projects and infrastructure 
management decisions—especially those that cause flooding or erosion, as discussed in more detail 
below.  
2.2 Regulatory Takings 
Massachusetts and its municipalities can implement regulations to promote the public health, safety, 
and welfare. Zoning and land use regulations limit how property owners can use their land and not 
infrequently give rise to takings claims. Most of these regulatory takings claims are reviewed as 
partial takings.  
Regulations rarely result in categorical takings because this category of claims requires the plaintiff to 
have suffered a complete deprivation of all economically viable use of their property.24 In Lucas v. 
South Carolina Coastal Council, the parties stipulated that a regulation requiring land on a barrier island 
“to be left substantially in its natural state” rendered the property valueless, and the Supreme Court 
found that this deprivation required the government to compensate its owner.25 However, a 
regulation leaving any residual value—even 5% of the property’s pre-regulation value—is not a 
categorical taking.26 Thus, a 32-month moratorium on development around Lake Tahoe was not a 
categorical taking because the property subject to the moratorium retained residual value.27 Similarly, 
in James v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Pembroke, the Massachusetts Court of Appeals found no 
categorical taking of a subdivided parcel where town zoning regulations prohibited development, 
because the property could be used for “woodland, wetland, or recreational use, or as additional 
acreage for residential abutters.”28 Thus, a regulatory taking claim will likely be categorized as a 
partial taking unless the plaintiff can prove that a regulation has left a property valueless. 
Most regulatory takings cases are reviewed as partial takings because they diminish, but do not 
extinguish, property value. These cases are founded on the recognition that “while property may be 
regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.”29 There is 
“no set formula” for deciding these cases;30 rather, cases are decided based on a highly fact-specific 
inquiry. The Supreme Court has identified three factors that courts must consider when evaluating 
regulatory partial takings cases:  
• “the character of the governmental action;”  
• “[t]he economic impact” on the property owner; and  
• “the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed 
expectations.”31  
Massachusetts courts have upheld a range pf coastal land use regulations against partial takings 
challenges.32 For example, in Gove v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Chatham, the plaintiff owned property 
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in a coastal conservancy overlay district where development was limited to specific, non-residential 
uses.33 The owner sued the town for a taking after a prospective buyer was denied a building 
permit.34 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court analyzed the takings claim under the three-
factor test.35 It found that the “character” of the conservation district ordinance was the “the type of 
limited protection against harmful private land use that routinely has withstood allegations of 
regulatory takings”36 – a conclusion supported by the factual record, which showed that the 
conservancy district was intended for “the protection of rescue workers and residents, the 
effectiveness of the town’s resources to respond to natural disasters, and the preservation of 
neighboring property.”37 The plaintiff had also failed to prove that the regulation caused a decline in 
the value of the property or interfered with her investment-backed expectations because she failed 
to provide a property assessment and because natural hazards—notably, a breach in the barrier 
island leading to increased erosion—had already reduced the property value before the regulation 
was adopted.38 As a result, the plaintiff failed to show that “she ever had any reasonable expectation of 
selling that particular lot for residential development, or that she has suffered any substantial loss as 
a result of the regulations.”39 As a result, the court found in Chatham’s favor. 
The Gove case illustrates several important considerations for municipal land use officials. First, while 
zoning regulations are often challenged, their character is not problematic in most cases. Rather, 
plaintiffs must prove that they have suffered a substantial economic deprivation causally tied to the 
regulation they are challenging. As the court noted in Gove, the value of coastal properties that are 
“exposed to the ravages of nature” can decline for a number of reasons, including not only 
regulations but also environmental conditions and speculation.40 The facts in the record in each 
particular case are likely to be determinative of the outcome of partial regulatory takings litigation. 
Municipalities therefore can prepare for takings challenges by documenting the reasons supporting 
their land use ordinances.  
3 Takings in the Coastal Context 
Coastal hazards, such as sea level rise and storm surge, create special risks for coastal properties. 
Municipal responses to these risks can and do result in takings litigation. This section reviews the 
potential for takings liability based on permitting decisions and infrastructure construction and 
management. 
3.1 Land Use Permitting 
Massachusetts municipalities may be exposed to takings litigation in the coastal context for several 
reasons. Lawsuits may result from denial of permit applications, (allegedly) improvident issuance of 
permits, and issuance of permits for activities that impact neighboring properties. This section 
briefly reviews each category of claim. 
First, applicants frequently allege takings for denial of permits, including building permit denial due 
to coastal hazards. As in the Gove case, Massachusetts courts have typically declined to find takings 
for building permit denial because the need to protect the public against coastal hazards is sufficient 
to justify reasonable restrictions on private development rights.41 However, the facts of specific 
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cases, and particularly the economic impacts and investment-backed expectations of plaintiffs, will 
determine the outcome of particular lawsuits. 
Second, permit-holders may seek to recover if a permit improvidently authorizes activity without 
accounting for coastal hazards, such as for structures destroyed in a hurricane. No cases were 
identified in the research for this fact sheet claiming that issuance of a permit was a taking of 
property because the government should have known that the permitted activity was unsafe or 
unsustainable.42 Instead, most cases arising from issued permits address the legality of permit 
conditions. These cases require that permit conditions requiring “exactions” of easements or 
funding, such as public easements for access to the shore or in-lieu fees for wetlands mitigation, are 
takings unless they “have an essential nexus and rough proportionality to the impacts of a proposed 
development.”43 Thus, while permit conditions may result in takings litigation, it is unlikely that 
landowners will successfully sue municipalities for failing to prevent them from undertaking 
hazardous activities. 
Finally, landowners may sue municipalities for issuing permits to their neighbors for activities which 
damage their properties. In contrast to a few decisions in other jurisdictions,44 Massachusetts courts 
have declined to find takings liability when the government permits an action that subsequently 
harms a neighbor’s property. For example, in Woods v. Massachusetts Department of Environmental 
Protection, the Woods’ claimed that the Department committed a taking by authorizing a neighbor to 
construct revetments that caused erosion on the Woods’ property and failing to enforce conditions 
in those permits requiring beach nourishment.45 The court found “no compelling reason to extend 
Massachusetts takings law to encompass a situation” where the government had not built or 
required private owners to build shoreline protection structures.46 However, in rare cases, coastal 
protection by non-governmental entities has been a taking. In Banks v. U.S., the government was 
liable for erosion caused by privately-constructed jetties because those jetties were themselves 
constructed to address erosion caused by the government’s own jetties.47 Thus, while the 
government usually is not liable for damages caused by private actors, this rules may not apply when 
the government motivates the private action. 
3.2 Municipal Infrastructure  
Coastal municipalities often have a substantial amount of infrastructure along the coast, such as 
sewage treatment systems, roadways, jetties or groins, and dams or water retention facilities. Coastal 
infrastructure construction and management can lead to takings liability when it causes or 
contributes to flooding, coastal erosion, or loss of access to private property.48  
In recent years, extreme storm events have resulted in numerous takings lawsuits stemming from 
flood management decisions. The Supreme Court held in 2012 that flooding, including temporary 
flooding, is a physical occupation of property and can be a taking.49 Thus, a change in management 
of a federal dam that flooded and destroyed timber in bottomland hardwood forests was a taking.50 
Similarly, the federal government was liable for flooding “upstream” plaintiffs who owned property 
above a federal dam following Hurricane Harvey because the dam owner, the U.S. Army Corps of 
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Engineers, knew that flooding of those properties was likely when it constructed the dams.51 The 
Court therefore found that the Corps had taken a “flowage easement” on the affected properties. 
When government flood management foreseeably will cause flooding of private property, the courts 
have not hesitated to find that a taking has occurred. 
While the courts have clarified that government-caused flooding is a taking, these holdings are 
limited by issues of causation and relative harm. The Corps prevailed in its defense against 
“downstream” plaintiffs flooded during Hurricane Harvey because Texas law did not require the 
dam owner to guarantee perfect flood control: the downstream properties would have been flooded 
whether or not the dam was present.52 Similarly, the government did not take property when it raised 
lake levels behind a dam to prevent a levee breach.53 Applying the “relative benefits doctrine,” the 
court determined that a breach of the levee would have caused worse damage to the plaintiffs’ 
properties than they suffered in reality, so they had no claim for compensation.54 Municipalities 
should be aware that temporary, storm-induced flooding caused by municipal-owned infrastructure 
can be a taking, but that causation, foreseeability, and other issues will affect liability.  
Several notable decisions have found governments liable for takings associated with groins, jetties, 
and other coastal and navigation infrastructure. This infrastructure can interrupt sediment transport 
along the coast, resulting in increased erosion of down-drift properties. While it can be difficult for 
property owners to prove that government infrastructure caused the erosion,55 especially given 
confounding factors such as storms and sea level rise, courts have consistently found the 
government liable when plaintiffs prove causation. For example, in Banks v. U.S., property owners 
recovered for erosion caused by a Corps-owned jetty protecting a navigable channel for harbor 
access.56 Thus, government-owned shoreline protection or harbor management structures that 
increase erosion on nearby properties are likely to require compensation. 
Coastal roadways are a third potential source of takings liability for municipalities. Coastal roadways 
in Massachusetts are flooding at increasing rates and may be damaged due to sea level rise and 
erosion, leading municipalities to consider discontinuance of affected roadways.57 Courts in several 
states have found that loss of access to the public road system is a compensable property right that 
can support a takings claim.58 Takings claims arising from discontinuance in Massachusetts would be 
difficult, as state courts have limited damages from discontinuance to instances where a parcel is 
rendered entirely landlocked and no longer has any access to a public road.59 Thus, while coastal 
highway management decisions could result in a takings claim under limited circumstances, these 
cases are limited in scope. 
4 Conclusion 
Massachusetts municipalities face several forms of potential takings claims when managing coastal 
property. Because takings law is rooted in the state and federal constitutions, state and local 
legislation cannot limit liability risk. Therefore, governments should consider potential claims when 
making coastal management decisions. If a government is willing to pay fair compensation for lost 
property rights, then it has broad authority to regulate or physically appropriate land for a public 
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purpose. However, if a government wishes to regulate private property without incurring the costs 
of takings claims, then it will need to (1) avoid physical appropriation of property; (2) avoid 
eliminating the entire economic use of the property through regulation; and (3) ensure that the 
benefits of the regulation are well-documented and outweigh harms to individual private property 
owners. Because regulatory takings cases are decided on the basis of a fact-specific analysis, it may 
be difficult for a government to predict whether a given regulation, permit decision, or infrastructure 
decision will result in a taking. Governments can prepare for possible claims by considering the 
effects of their decisions on private parties and documenting the reasons and evidence supporting 
their decisions. 
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